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Abstract 
 
The way in which little GAAP has emerged in the UK suggests that policy makers have 
taken an arbitrary and piecemeal approach to reform, and this is reflected in the number of 
changes to disclosure requirements and the frequency with which qualifying size thresholds 
are revised.  This seems surprising, since the accounting profession has spent almost a 
decade in developing a conceptual framework for financial reporting. The government‟s 
rationale for regulatory relaxation for smaller entities is based on reducing the cost burden, 
rather than any theoretical considerations.  Moreover, reforms are being made without 
evidence of the needs of the directors of small companies, who are the main users of the 
accounts. 
 
The aim of the study is to provide generalisable evidence of the utility of the statutory 
financial statements of small companies to the directors. It took the form of a postal 
questionnaire survey of the directors of a tranche of 385 companies meeting the 1999 EC 
size criteria for a small company.  These are the companies that are most likely to be 
affected by proposals to lift the UK size thresholds that qualify companies to apply little 
GAAP.  This paper focuses on the factors that influence the filing choices of the directors 
of these small companies and the demand for abbreviated accounts. 
 
The results show that the majority of directors chose to file full accounts in the year 
preceding the survey.  Whether full or abbreviated accounts were filed, the accountant‟s 
advice plays a key role.  A range of reasons for the filing choice made are revealed and a 
logistic regression model provides evidence that the abbreviated accounts are likely to be 
the choice of directors of smaller companies, as measured by turnover, who consider there 
are cost benefits to the business from this choice.  The average turnover of such companies 
is £0.9m.  These results should be of interest to policy makers involved in reforming little 
GAAP in the UK, as well as those concerned with international harmonisation of financial 
reporting by small companies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study is set within the context of the current deregulatory trend in financial reporting 
by small companies in the UK and was supported by the ICAEW. For historical reasons, 
UK GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles) has evolved with the needs of large, 
public companies in mind, but since the 1980s the importance of the role played by small 
businesses in the country‟s economy has increased.  Indeed, 99% of the business stock and 
96% of companies have fewer than 50 employees and are therefore classified by the 
government for statistical purposes as small (SBS, 2000, Table 22). 
 
This change of emphasis led to an escalation of the big GAAP/little GAAP debate.  This 
debate is concerned with the question of whether it is necessary for small companies to be 
subject to the same extensive range of reporting requirements that govern large (often 
multinational) public companies and whether small companies should be exempt from 
some aspects of GAAP on the grounds of size and relative lack of public interest in their 
financial statements.  One of the main difficulties is determining the criteria that should be 
used to exempt companies (Hussey, 1999), which seems surprising, since the accounting 
profession has spent almost a decade in developing a conceptual framework for financial 
reporting. 
 
The result of the debate has been the gradual emergence of little GAAP, which consists of 
certain concessions and exemptions for smaller entities.  The principal aim of the 
government in reforming the legal elements of the regulatory framework to develop little 
GAAP is to relieve the burden of compliance, which it is argued falls disproportionately on 
small businesses compared to their larger counterparts (DTI, 1985).  Thus, the changes are 
aimed at reducing costs, rather than theoretical assumptions.  Moreover, little attention has 
been given to any benefits and reforms are being made without generalisable empirical 
evidence how little GAAP is being received by the directors of small companies, who are 
the main users of the accounts (Carsberg, Page, Sindall and Waring, 1985).  This is a 
serious omission and at odds the government‟s views on evidence based policy making 
(Cabinet Office, 1999). 
 
The purpose of the present research is to provide generalisable evidence of the utility of 
the statutory financial statements of small companies to the directors in the context of 
emerging little GAAP.  This paper is drawn from a large study and focuses on current and 
future reporting practices, and perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of 
financial reporting.  The research took the form of a postal questionnaire survey in 1999 of 
a representative sample of private limited companies with a turnover of up to £4.2m, a 
balance sheet total of up to £2.1m and up to 50 employees.  This ensured that the sample 
included companies that fell within the definition of „small‟ under UK law, as well as those 
that would be reclassified as „small‟ if thresholds were raised to the EC maxima at that 
time. 
 
The next section of this paper provides the background to the study by examining the 
development of little GAAP as it applies to small companies in the UK.
1
  This is followed 
                                               
1
 This discussion is limited to the various simplifications and exemptions from compliance with the 
mainstream regulations that are offered to eligible small companies, although some concessions are also 
available to medium-sized companies. 
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by a description of the methodology.  The results are presented and discussed in the fourth 
section and the paper ends by drawing conclusions. 
 
2. The development of little GAAP in the UK 
 
Prior to the Companies Act 1981, all corporate entities, irrespective of their size, the 
industry they operated in or the public‟s interest in them, were broadly governed by 
identical financial reporting requirements.  In recent years, however, there have been rapid 
and widespread developments as a result of the adoption of the provisions of the EC 
Fourth and Seventh Company Law Directives, which allow the disclosure requirements for 
companies of different sizes to be varied. 
 
2.1 Exemptions from statutory disclosure 
 
It was the Companies Act 1981 that first distinguished small and medium-sized companies 
and permitted them to file modified accounts with the Registrar of Companies; they were 
still required to prepare full accounts for shareholders.  The Companies Act 1985, which 
consolidated the 1981 Act and was amended by the 1989 Act, introduced other changes.  
These included revised terminology and the Act now refers to „abbreviated‟ rather than 
„modified‟ financial statements. 
 
Under the Companies Act 1985 a company may qualify as small if it satisfies certain size 
tests and meets other qualification criteria (banking companies, insurance companies and 
authorised persons under the Financial Services Act 1986 are excluded on the grounds of 
public interest).  As far as size is concerned, the qualifying conditions are met by a 
company if it does not exceed two or more of the criteria shown for the UK Table 1 in 
relation to the financial year concerned and the preceding year.  The table also shows the 
EC maxima in force in 1999 (when the study was conducted) and the most recent EC 
thresholds which the government proposes are adopted by the UK (DTI, 1999a). 
 
Table 1 Size thresholds for small companies 
 
 UK maxima EC maxima at the 
time of the study 
Present 
EC maxima 
Annual turnover £2.8m £4.2m £4.8m 
Balance sheet total £1.4m £2.1m £2.4m 
Average number of employees 50 50 50 
 
In 1997 the DTI amended the Companies Act 1985 (SI 1997/220) by introducing a revised 
Schedule 8 and a new Schedule 8A, which set out in full the provisions of Schedule 4 that 
apply to small companies.  Under the provisions, a small company may choose to file full 
or abbreviated accounts with the Registrar of Companies, but must provide full financial 
statements for shareholders.  A small company choosing to file abbreviated financial 
statements is not required to file a profit and loss account or a directors‟ report and may 
file an abbreviated or a shorter-form
2
 balance sheet and notes thereto. 
 
                                               
2 „Shorter-form‟ is used to refer to the individual or group financial statements small companies are 
permitted to prepare for shareholders by virtue of section 246(2)-(4) of the Companies Act 1985. 
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Under section 246(3)(b) of the Companies Act (inserted by SI 1997/220 and amended by 
SI 1997/570), a small company‟s privacy is protected by not having to disclose certain 
information from the notes to the accounts.  In particular, information from Schedule 6 
regarding directors‟ emoluments can be omitted: the numbers of directors exercising share 
options and receiving shares under long-term incentives schemes; details of the highest 
paid director‟s remuneration; details of directors‟ and past directors‟ excess retirement 
benefits. 
 
Abbreviated accounts must be accompanied by a special auditors‟ report, unless the 
company is exempt from the requirement for an audit by virtue of sections 249A(1) or (2) 
or section 250 of the Companies Act 1985 (see below).  This report must state that in the 
auditors‟ opinion the company is entitled to deliver abbreviated financial statements and 
that the statements are properly prepared in accordance with the relevant sections of the 
Companies Act. 
 
2.2 Audit exemption 
 
The EC Fourth Directive permitted national governments to dispense with the requirement 
for small companies to undergo an audit.  This prompted the government in 1994 to 
amend section 249A of the Companies Act 1985 (SI 1994/1935) to exempt companies 
with an annual turnover of up to £90,000 and a balance sheet total of up to £1.4m.  
Companies with a turnover of between £90,000 and £350,000 were given the option of 
filing a simpler audit exemption report in place of the full audit report.  Following the 
publication of a consultation document (DTI, 1997), the audit turnover threshold was 
revised to £350,000 (SI 1997/936), thereby removing the statutory requirement for the 
audit exemption report. 
 
In 1999 the DTI announced proposals to raise the thresholds again, possibly up to the 
maximum levels set by the EC (DTI, 1999b). In most EU countries the threshold is 
substantially higher than in the UK (typically, £2m-£4m), but there are also legal and 
regulatory differences, as well as variations in the company populations and size 
distributions.  These factors make inter-country comparisons problematic.  The rationale 
for this increase focuses mainly on potential cost savings for increased numbers of small 
companies.  It is difficult to estimate how many companies would be affected by such a 
change. There are some 380,000 companies that file abbreviated accounts and since such 
accounts do not include turnover figures it is not possible to calculate how many of them 
fall within the current or proposed exemption levels (DTI, 1999c).  Based on the accounts 
of 750,000 companies at Companies House where the turnover data is available, the DTI 
estimates that 520,000 (69%) are currently within the exemption threshold, and that lifting 
the level to £4.2m would increase the number by 185,000 to 705,000 (94%).  In addition, 
an estimated 90,000 companies that currently file abbreviated accounts would be able to 
opt out if the threshold was raised to the maximum.  This would bring the total number of 
companies to approximately 795,000 (DTI, 1999c, pp. 5-6). 
 
Following a period of consultation, in 2000 a two-stage increase in the threshold was 
announced.  The first stage was to raise the threshold to £1m followed by a further 
increase to the maximum EC level to be made in the light of the Company Law Review‟s 
final proposals on the accounts and audit of small companies.  This would include 
consideration of whether some less burdensome form of assurance should be required for 
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companies with a turnover of between £1m and £4.8m (DTI, 2000). 
 
Exemption from the audit removes the need for the directors to engage an independent, 
professionally qualified and regulated person.  To some extent, minority shareholders, who 
might not otherwise be able to obtain accounts with any external assurance, are protected 
by provisions that allow for an audit if it is required by at least 10% of the shareholders. 
 
2.3 Accounting standards 
 
Although the issue of accounting standards and small entities was considered by the ASC 
in 1983, it was not until five years later that a statement on the application of accounting 
standards to small companies was published (ASC, 1988).  The next development was in 
November 1994 when a working party of the Consultative Committee of Accountancy 
Bodies (CCAB) was set up at the request of the ASB to carry out a consultation exercise 
to assess whether companies should be exempted from compliance with accounting 
standards on the grounds of size or public interest. The working party concluded that the 
needs of the „less complex entities and those who deal with them would be best served by 
straightforward, uncomplicated accounts and that some of the requirements of accounting 
standards tend to conflict with these needs‟ (CCAB, 1994, p. 15).  
 
The result of the consultation showed clear support for some relief based on size, or a 
combination of size and public interest, and the working party recommended the 
promulgation of a specific financial reporting standard for smaller entities (CCAB, 1995).   
Accordingly, the ASB published an exposure draft (ASB, 1996) and subsequently issued 
the Financial Reporting Standard for Smaller Entities (FRSSE) (ASB, 1997 and 
subsequent revisions). The FRSSE is applicable to all reporting entities that qualify as 
small under the Companies Act 1985 and collects together in one document, and in 
simplified form, the accounting standards and other requirements for preparing and 
presenting the financial statements of smaller businesses. 
 
If the entities within its scope choose to adopt the FRSSE, they become exempt from 
applying all other accounting standards and UITF abstracts.  Alternatively, they can 
choose not to adopt it and remain subject to the full range of accounting standards and 
UITF abstracts.  The measurement bases in the FRSSE are the same as, or a simplification 
of, those in existing accounting standards, and the definitions and accounting treatments 
are consistent with the requirements of company legislation. The disclosure requirements 
exclude a number of those stipulated in other accounting standards. 
 
2.4 Review of company law 
 
In 1998 the DTI launched a fundamental review of core company law and one of the key 
issues in the consultation document is that the law should recognise that the vast majority 
of companies are small or medium-sized by adopting a „think small first‟ approach (DTI, 
1999d).  The Review puts forward a number of measures „to reduce the burden of 
financial reporting and audit while improving the usefulness of small company accounts‟ 
(DTI, 2001, p. 3).  A major recommendation is that the format and contents of small 
company accounts should be simplified and small companies should no longer be able to 
file what are referred to as „uninformative‟ abbreviated accounts.  The Review also 
recommends that the size thresholds for companies able to use the small company 
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accounting regime should be raised to the maximum allowed under EU law (see Table 1).  
Thresholds for exemption from the audit should be raised in the same way. 
 
2.5 Development of the theoretical framework 
 
Little is known about the take-up levels of the filing options available to small companies 
or the reasons for their choices.  The main benefit of filing abbreviated accounts, 
particularly for a small company with a single product, is that it makes much less 
information available to competitors (Davies, Paterson and Wilson, 1997).  However, 
abbreviated accounts are an additional set of financial statements that are drawn from the 
full financial statements specifically for the purpose of delivery to the Registrar of 
Companies.  Therefore, there are likely to be additional costs involved in taking up the 
option to file abbreviated accounts. 
 
Government statistics do not allow the total number of small and medium-sized companies 
that are eligible to file abbreviated accounts to be calculated.  However, in 1994 the CCAB 
estimated that only 35% of small and medium-sized companies eligible to file abbreviated 
accounts were doing so at that time.  Actual figures for 1999/00 show that of the 835,900 
large, medium and small companies
3
 filing annual accounts at Companies House, 41% 
were small and medium-sized companies filing abbreviated accounts (DTI, 2000, Table F2, 
p. 44).  Thus, it would appear that a significant proportion of qualifying companies make 
full public disclosure by choice, lack of knowledge of the alternatives or because it they are 
required to do so under company law. 
 
There are three significant gaps in the literature regarding the financial reporting 
concessions offered by little GAAP in the UK: 
 
 There is no empirical evidence on the appropriateness or sufficiency of the 
government‟s chosen size criteria of turnover, balance sheet total and number of 
employees for determining eligibility to apply little GAAP. 
 There is a lack of evidence concerning the benefits and costs of applying little GAAP. 
 It is not known why small companies differ in their choice of whether to apply little 
GAAP.  For example, it is not known whether the directors of eligible companies who 
do not apply little GAAP make an informed decision or simply do not realise that they 
have a choice.  
 
This paper begins to address these deficiencies by investigating the following research 
question: 
 
What factors influence filing options taken by the directors of small companies? 
 
This question is broken down into the following subsidiary questions: 
 
1. What are the take-up levels of the fling options available under little GAAP as it was in 
1999? 
2. What are the reasons for the filing choices made? 
                                               
3 This excludes dormant companies and those filing group accounts or interim/initial accounts. 
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3. Do the size criteria in company law capture the disclosure needs of small companies? 
 
3.  Methodology 
 
The study took the form of a large postal questionnaire survey following an exploratory 
study.
4
   The sample companies were selected from FAME, which contains information on 
270,000 British companies taken from the returns made to the Registrar of Companies. 
One limitation of this choice is that the database does not include many companies with a 
turnover of under £0.5m.
5
  However, the information is detailed, up to date and easy to 
access.  A search of the database was conducted at the beginning of March 1999 to 
identify all active, independent,
6
 private limited companies that met the following size 
criteria
7
 in the most recent year for which accounts were filed: 
 
 turnover of up to £4.2m (information available for 46% of companies on FAME as 
only companies filing full accounts disclose this figure); 
 balance sheet total of up to £2.1m (information available for 100% of companies on 
FAME); 
 number of employees of up to 50 (information available for 32% of companies on 
FAME). 
 
These search criteria provided a list of 11,648 companies filing full, audited accounts 
(£350,000 turnover being the audit exemption level at the time of selection). The list was 
sorted alphabetically and a systematic random sample taken by selecting every fifth 
company.  This gave an initial list of 2,327 companies, from which 39 were later eliminated 
as they were outside the scope of the study, which reduced the list to 2,288.  After two 
follow-ups, a total of 385 usable replies were received, giving a response rate of 17% and 
sufficient to allow the results to be generalised from the sample to the population.
8
  
 
In any large survey the problem of questionnaire non-response bias must be addressed, 
since it is not likely that all those surveyed will respond.  Previous research (Morgan, 
1974; Wallace and Mellor, 1988) suggests that non-respondents behave like late 
respondents.  Therefore, one method for testing for non-response bias is to compare the 
characteristics of the respondents to the first mailing with those who reply to the second 
request.  This was done by conducting an independent samples t test to look for 
differences in the mean age, turnover, total assets, number of employees and number of 
shareholders of the two batches of respondents.  The results were non-significant in each 
case, confirming that there was no difference between early and later respondents and that 
the findings of the study can be generalised to the wider population of similar companies. 
 
                                               
4 The results of the exploratory study were subsequently published (Collis, Dugdale and Jarvis, 2001).  
5 Therefore the sample is not representative of companies below this level.  
6 Subsidiary companies were excluded. 
7 These are the maximum levels under EU law at the time the companies were selected. 
8 According to Krejcie and Morgan (1970, p. 608), for populations of 1m or more, the minimum 
acceptable sample size is 384. 
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4. Results and discussion 
 
4.1 The sample companies 
 
Table 2 shows a breakdown of the sample companies by size. 
 
Table 2 Companies by size 
 
Criteria No. of 
companies 
% of 
companies 
Turnover   
    Under £1m 238 62 
    £1.0m – £1.99m   72 19 
    £2.0m – £2.99m   38 10 
    £3.0m – £3.99m   32 8 
    £4.0m - £4.2m     5 1 
Total assets   
    Under £0.5m 187 49 
    £0.5m – £0.99m   93 24 
    £1.0m – £1.99m   96 25 
    £2.0m – £2.1m     9 2 
Employees   
    Up to 10 199 52 
    11 – 20   94 24 
    21 – 30   41 11 
    31 – 40   30 8 
    41 – 50   21 5 
 
N = 385 
Source: FAME 
 
The table illustrates that even though the sample was not representative of companies with 
a turnover of less than £0.5m at the time of selection, the majority of small companies are 
concentrated at the lower end of the spectrum in terms of all three size criteria 
 
4.2 Filing choice 
 
At the time of selection, the most recent accounts filed by all the sample companies were 
full accounts.  However, as described in section 2, the filing options set out in the 
Companies Act 1985 allow qualifying small and medium-sized companies to prepare and 
file either full audited accounts or unaudited abbreviated financial statements.  As the 
qualification criteria are complex, it is not possible to be certain about the eligibility of the 
sample companies to apply this aspect of little GAAP, but on the basis of size, it is likely 
that all the sample companies would qualify. 
  
Rather than ask the respondents about their practices in general, critical incident technique 
(Flanagan, 1954) was used to focus their attention on the filing decision taken the previous 
year.  Whether the accounts filed are full or abbreviated, a director must sign the balance 
sheet on behalf of the board.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the principal 
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directors of the sample companies would know what type of accounts the company had 
prepared.  Table 3 shows their responses. 
 
Table 3 Filing choice last year 
 
Filing choice No. of 
companies 
% of 
companies 
Full accounts 252   66 
Abbreviated accounts 113   29 
Uncertain/no response   20     5 
Total 385 100 
 
Although the sample consisted entirely of companies that had filed full accounts in the 
most recent year, Table 3 reveals that more than a quarter (29%) had filed abbreviated 
accounts the previous year.  This must be interpreted in the context that the sample 
included companies that under the current size thresholds would not qualify as small and, 
therefore, would not have this option.  Nevertheless, this analysis indicates that 29% had 
switched to filing full accounts.  Unfortunately, it is not possible to ascertain whether this 
switch was due to a proximity to the threshold (or other change in eligibility), or some 
other factor.  Some respondents volunteered that they were planning to file abbreviated 
accounts for the next accounting period. 
  
It was noted in section 2 that the total number of small and medium-sized companies that 
are eligible to file abbreviated accounts is not known.  Of the 835,900 large, medium and 
small companies
9
 filing annual accounts at Companies House in 1999/00, 41% were small 
and medium-sized companies filing abbreviated accounts (DTI, 2000, Table F2, p. 44).  
This contrasts with the finding in the above table that 29% of companies had filed 
abbreviated accounts the previous year.  There are three likely explanations for this 
difference, both of which are concerned with sample bias.  First, the sample in the present 
study is biased towards companies filing full accounts and second, it is not representative 
of companies with a turnover under £0.5m, whose directors are more likely to take up this 
option. Third, the sample included companies that are not yet able to apply little GAAP. 
Further analysis found that the mean turnover of companies that chose to file abbreviated 
accounts was £0.9m and the mean turnover of those filing full accounts was £1.3m.  
However, this must also be interpreted in the context of the size of companies included in 
the sample. 
 
4.3 Reasons for the filing choice 
 
In order to explore the directors‟ perceptions of the costs and benefits of this particular 
aspect of little GAAP, respondents were asked to state the main reason for their filing 
choice.  This was designed as an open question and the results have been derived from 
classifying the replies. 
 
                                               
9 This excludes dormant companies and those filing group accounts or interim/initial accounts. 
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Table 4 shows the reasons given by the 252 companies that had filed full accounts the 
previous year. 
 
Table 4 Main reason for filing full accounts 
 
Reason No. of  
companies 
% of 
companies 
To meet our statutory obligations   63   25 
On the advice of our accountant   56   22 
We always file full accounts   30   12 
We want to make full disclosure   25   10 
There are cost benefits   15     6 
Other   23     9 
No reason given   40    16 
Total 252 100 
 
The most commonly cited reason is that the directors are meeting their statutory 
obligations (reported by a quarter of respondents) and for some of these companies filing 
full accounts is their only option, as they are not eligible to apply little GAAP.  A further 
12% said that they always filed full accounts.  It is difficult to know whether these 
directors actively wanted to make full disclosure, were not eligible to file abbreviated 
accounts or were unaware that they have a choice. 
 
Other respondents were more specific.  Just under a quarter (22%) had filed full accounts 
on the advice of their accountant and it seems highly likely that the directors would take 
professional advice over this important decision.  The survey found that 31% of the 
companies have a qualified accountant on the board of directors or on the staff and 84% 
have their accounts prepared by an external accountant.  Therefore, accountancy advice 
should be readily available. 
 
There may have been a number of reasons for advising full disclosure, the most important 
of which hinges on the question of the company‟s eligibility to file abbreviated accounts.  
Full disclosure would also be advised if the directors were planning a flotation or other 
form of external investment (Olsson, 1980).   It might also be important if they wished to 
enhance their corporate image (Korn Ferry, 1986; Martin, 1989); indeed, one respondent 
mentioned that his company filed full accounts because in his opinion, “It looks more 
professional”. 
 
If there were no need to protect confidentiality, there may be commercial benefits from 
choosing full disclosure (a reason given by 10%). As one executive chairman explained, 
“We want to show the growth and performance of the company and that we‟ve got 
nothing to hide”.  Although it is more expensive to prepare abbreviated accounts, as they 
are drawn from the full accounts, the cost benefits of filing full accounts were cited by 
fewer than 10% of respondents. 
 
Table 5 shows the reasons given by the respondents of the 113 companies that had filed 
abbreviated accounts the previous year. 
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Table 5 Main reason for filing abbreviated accounts 
 
Reason No. of 
companies 
% of 
companies 
We want to disclosure legal minimum 42  37 
On the advice of our accountant 22  20 
There are cost benefits 18  16 
To meet our statutory obligations 17  15 
Other   2    2 
No reason given  12  10 
Total 113 100 
 
It is widely acknowledged that, regardless of size, one of the aims of management is to 
comply with regulatory requirements with the minimum disclosure of information that 
would be advantageous to a competitor (Mace, 1977; Hussey and Everitt, 1991). This is 
reflected in the most common reason for filing abbreviated accounts (cited by 37%).  As 
one respondent stated, “We‟ve got something to hide!” A further 15% gave no details as 
to why they chose to file abbreviated accounts apart from the fact that it was the way they 
were meeting their statutory obligations. 
 
Acting on their accountant‟s advice was the reason given by 20% of respondents, which is 
unexpected, as the application of the criteria for defining small and medium-sized 
companies can be complex.  In addition to satisfying the basic size tests, companies must 
also satisfy other qualification criteria, which may be difficult to interpret. 
 
More surprising is the finding that 16% of respondents consider that there are cost benefits 
attached to filing abbreviated accounts, despite the fact that the preparation of these 
accounts must be in addition to the full accounts prepared for shareholders. 
 
4.4 Factors influencing the filing choice 
 
Little is known about the factors that influence the filing choice and why the majority of 
companies do not take up the option to file unaudited abbreviated accounts.  Although the 
government is planning to abolish this particular form of reduced disclosure, this is still an 
important issue as there are plans to offer a new form of simplified accounts.  These will be 
applicable to an even greater range of smaller companies: all those qualifying as small 
under the 2002 EC maxima.  From the analysis in the previous section it is clear that the 
accountant plays a key role in the filing decision, together with the directors‟ views on the 
costs and benefits of the options.  In addition to these qualitative factors, company law 
implies that there are size factors that have a bearing on the financial reporting needs of 
smaller companies.  Therefore, a logistic regression model was built to answer the 
following research question: 
 
Do the size criteria in company law capture the financial reporting needs of small 
companies in terms of filing preferences? 
 
This is broken down into a number of economic and theoretical hypotheses, which are 
presented below in the alternate form.  The first arises from the economic rationale implicit 
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in company law that the cost of financial reporting falls disproportionately on small 
companies: 
 
H1: ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing to file abbreviated accounts 
increases inversely with size of company.  A subsidiary hypothesis relates to the issue of 
whether turnover, balance sheet total or number of employees more effectively measures 
size in this context. 
 
The second and third hypotheses emanate from the contention that the filing choice is 
influenced by management‟s beliefs about the costs and benefits of filing abbreviated 
accounts: 
 
H2: ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing to file abbreviated accounts 
increases if their accountant recommends that they do so. 
H3: ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing to file abbreviated accounts 
increases with their belief that there are cost benefits in doing so. 
 
Table 6 shows the variables in the analysis. 
 
Table 6 Filing choice: Variables in the analysis 
 
Variable Description Expected 
sign 
Hypothesis 
tested 
DV    
ABBREVD Whether the company filed abbreviated accounts 
last year  (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
  
IVs    
TOVER Size of company as measured by turnover (£m) -ve H1 
ASSETS Size of company as measured by balance sheet 
total (£m) 
-ve H1 
EMPLS Size of company as measured by number of 
employees 
-ve H1 
ADVISED Whether the accountant advised the company on 
their filing choice (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
+ve H2 
COSTBENE   Whether the director considers there are cost 
benefits in their filing choice (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
+ve H3 
 
The data was screened for potential problems with collinearity among the independent size 
variables, which are measured on a ratio scale,
10
 and Table 7 shows a satisfactory level of 
correlation with no suggestion of singularity. 
 
Table 7 Filing choice: Correlation matrix of ratio IVs 
 
Variable TOVER ASSETS EMPLS 
TOVER 1.000   
ASSETS     .620* 1.000  
EMPLS     .547*     .457* 1.000 
 
Notes: N = 358 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
                                               
10 ADVISED and COSTBENE are measured on a nominal scale and are not suitable for this treatment. 
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As the independent variables TOVER, ASSETS and EMPLS are not normally distributed 
in small companies, a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test was conducted against the 
dependent variable (ABBREVD).  This analysis tests each variable against the hypothesis 
that the two sub-samples in the dependent variable (those that chose to file abbreviated 
accounts and those that filed full accounts) come from populations with the same 
distribution.  Table 8 gives details. 
 
Table 8 Filing choice: Mann-Whitney U tests on non-parametric ratio IVs 
 
Variable ABBREVD N Mean 
rank 
Sum of 
ranks 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W Z p 
TOVER 0 No 252 198.27 49963.0 10391.0 16832.0 –4.128 .000 
 1 Yes 113 148.96 16832.0     
 Total 365       
ASSETS 0 No 252 185.97 46865.5 13488.5 19929.5   –.804 .421 
 1 Yes 113 176.37 19929.5     
 Total 365       
EMPLS 0 No 252 195.02 49144.0 11210.0 17651.0 –3.254 .001 
 1 Yes 113 156.20 17651.0     
 Total 365       
 
The table shows a significant difference in the mean ranks of the two sub-samples in the 
case of TOVER and EMPLS, which allows the hypothesis for each to be rejected.  
However, no significant difference is present in relation to ASSETS, so the hypothesis is 
not rejected and this variable is not entered in the predictive model. 
 
The remaining independent variables are dichotomous dummy variables measured on a 
nominal scale.  Therefore, chi-square tests were conducted to test the same hypothesis that 
the two sub-samples are not independent of each other.  Table 9 shows the results. 
 
Table 9 Filing choice: Chi-square tests on nominal IVs 
 
Variable  ABBREVD 
0 No      1 Yes 
N Chi-square df p 
ADVISED 0 No 156 79 235 0.785 1 .376 
 1 Yes   56   22   78    
 Total 212 101 313    
COSTBENE 0 No 197   83 280 8.376 1 .004 
 1 Yes   15   18   33    
 Total 212 101 313    
 
The probability statistic in relation to ADVISED indicates that there is no significant 
difference between the two sub-samples.  This means that directors choosing to file 
abbreviated accounts and those choosing to file full accounts are similar in terms of relying 
on the advice from their accountant.  Therefore, the hypothesis is not rejected and H2 is 
rejected.  However, there is a significant difference in the two sub-samples in terms of 
seeing their filing choice as bringing costs benefits and, therefore, evidence to reject the 
hypothesis in relation to COSTBENE. 
 
The first logistic regression model was developed to test the hypothesis that the likelihood 
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of the directors choosing to file abbreviated accounts increases inversely with the size of 
the company as measured by turnover and number of employees respectively (H1).  The 
results are shown in panels A and B in Table 10.  The final model tests the hypothesis that 
the likelihood of the directors choosing to file abbreviated accounts increases with their 
belief that there are cost benefits in doing so (H3).  The results of this test are shown in 
panels C of Table 10. 
 
Table 10 Filing choice: Logistic regression model 
 
 Variable B SE Wald df p Exp(B) 
Panel A TOVER    -.367 .122   9.088 1 .003   .693 
 Constant  -.411 .165   6.187 1 .013   .663 
Panel B EMPLS  -.019 .010   3.760 1 .052   .982 
 Constant  -.545 .170 10.287 1 .001   .580 
Panel C TOVER     -.331 .134   6.119 1 .013   .718 
 COSTBENE    .870 .381   5.119 1 .022 2.388 
 Constant  -.498 .190   6.845 1 .009   .608 
 
Notes: N = 385 
Model summaries: 
      Panel A: Chi-square 10.186; df 1; p <0.01; -2 log likelihood 441.517; pseudo R2 .039 
      Panel B: Chi-square   3.971; df 1; p <0.05; -2 log likelihood 447.732; pseudo R2 .015 
 Panel C: Chi-square 14.539; df 2; p <0.01; -2 log likelihood 379.137; pseudo R2 .063 
 
Interpreting the table, the probability statistics in panels A and B show that TOVER is 
significant whereas EMPLS is not.  The results in panel C demonstrate that when TOVER 
and COSTBENE are combined in the model, both are significant.  The factor coefficient 
for TOVER indicates the expected negative relationship between the size of turnover and 
choosing to file abbreviated accounts.  This provides evidence to accept H1 in terms of 
turnover.  The positive sign on the factor coefficient for COSTBENE indicates that cost 
benefits are associated with the filing of abbreviated accounts, and this evidence allows H3 
to be accepted. 
 
It is notable that the model shown in panel A, where turnover is the sole explanatory 
factor, has a higher level of significance and a higher Wald value than the model shown in 
panel C where cost benefits are added.  However, comparison of the pseudo R
2
 results 
shows that the first model only explains 4% of the demand for full accounts, whereas the 
final model accounts for 6%.  This suggests that further research is required to identify 
other factors, but for the time being it can be concluded that turnover alone is sufficient to 
capture the financial reporting needs of small companies in terms of filing preferences.  
This is an important finding and has implications for the planned regulatory reform of this 
aspect of little GAAP. 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
The way in which little GAAP has emerged in the UK suggests that policy makers have 
taken an arbitrary and piecemeal approach to reform.  This is reflected in the number of 
changes to disclosure requirements and also the frequency with which the qualifying size 
thresholds are revised.  This is surprising, given the publication of the conceptual 
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framework (ASB, 1999), which provides a theoretical underpinning for financial reporting 
in the UK.  The government‟s rationale for the emergent little GAAP rests on reducing the 
cost of financial reporting by small companies and little attention has been given to any 
benefits. Moreover, changes are being made without generalisable evidence of how little 
GAAP is being received by the main users of the statutory accounts, the directors of small 
companies themselves.  This too is surprising, given the government‟s stance on evidence 
based policy making (Cabinet Office, 1999). 
 
This study addresses some of the deficiencies in the literature and focuses on a tranche of 
companies that are most likely to be affected by proposals to lift the size thresholds that 
qualify companies to apply little GAAP.  At the time of selection, all the sample companies 
had filed full accounts, but the survey reveals that the previous year 30% had filed 
abbreviated accounts. The average turnover of companies that chose to file abbreviated 
accounts was £0.9m whilst the average turnover of companies filing full accounts was 
£1.3m.
11
 
 
Reduced disclosure is not seen universally as being beneficial to the business.  Some of the 
directors who had filed full accounts stated that their main reason for their choice was 
because they specifically wanted to make full disclosure.  Thus, the option to file 
abbreviated accounts is seen as advantageous in some companies, but not in others. This 
provides further evidence of the heterogeneity present in the small business sector (Curran 
and Blackburn, 2001). 
 
Whether they chose to file full or abbreviated accounts, a significant proportion of 
directors made the decision based on advice received from their accountant.  This is not 
surprising, as accountants are in the best position to offer guidance on this highly regulated 
matter.  A key factor in the filing decision is the company‟s eligibility to file abbreviated 
accounts. In addition to satisfying the basic size tests, companies must also satisfy other 
qualification criteria, which may be difficult to interpret and therefore require professional 
advice.  A second important factor is that the accountant knows the client‟s business and 
can therefore discuss the advantages and disadvantages of filing abbreviated accounts, 
which protect commercial confidentiality but also incur higher accountancy fees. 
 
Two factors that explain the demand for abbreviated accounts are revealed.  Empirical 
evidence is provided that the abbreviated accounts are filed by smaller companies, as 
measured by turnover, but not in terms of balance sheet total or number of employees.  
This is an important corrective to earlier work by Keasey and Short (1990) on this topic.  
In addition, abbreviated accounts are filed by the directors of companies who see cost 
benefits for the business in doing so.  This may seem surprising, given the additional 
accountancy costs associated with preparing abbreviated accounts, but suggests that these 
are outweighed by the benefit of protecting commercial sensitive information. 
 
These results have important implications for the reform of company law.  First, proposals 
in the UK to raise the turnover threshold to £4.8m would not be seen as a benefit by many 
companies.  Second, it is apparent that turnover alone is a sufficient measure for capturing 
the net benefits of full or reduced disclosure by small companies. 
                                               
11 Care must be taken when interpreting this finding, as the sample was not fully representative of 
companies with a turnover of less than £0.5m. 
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